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Abstract 
The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar1 of the EU is the exchange of 
intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of 
data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore 
come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission 
in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally 
been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data 
security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised 
by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex2, when they say that 
they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy 
for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection 
to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home 
affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.”3 The focus of the literature published on 
this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the 
focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection,4 
a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be 
made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were 
based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that 
a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in 
order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU 
crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to 
the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within 
PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen 
Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of 
Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration 
data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 
2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a 
patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, 
like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”.5 Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in 
                       
1 Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.  
2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) {SEC(2010) 149} {SEC(2010) 150}, COM(2010) 
61. 
3 ibid. in pages 4-5 of the introduction. 
4 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco; Shortcomings in EU data protection in the third and the Second Pillars, Can the 
Lisbon Treaty be expected to help? CMLRev. 46: 1485-1525, 2009. 
5 ibid. at p.1496. 
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organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal 
framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU. 
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DATA PROTECTION LAWS ARE VERY MUCH A CHILD OF OUR TIMES, WITH            
“automated massive processing of personal data”6, bringing the issue to the fore. Legal 
frameworks began to be developed in the 1960s, with much of their development 
happening during the 1970s and 1980s.7 EU concepts underlying data protection have 
developed differently from those in other parts of the world, notably the United States, 
where the divide between the two “is a stark example”.8 The concepts of data protection 
and privacy are seen as being closely connected, with “a significant overlap between the 
two”9, and privacy being “a contested legal concept”.10 The German Federal Constitutional 
Court11 has developed what has become the EU approach on the matter.12 OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data were 
adopted in 198013, with the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data being signed in 1981.14 The UN also 
published Guidelines Concerning Computerised Data files in 1990.15 Most of these 
initiatives have been in the area of commercial data, with the intention of defending 
“individuals against the “intrusive” State.”16 The processing of data for counter-terrorism 
and law enforcement purposes have, however, not been so well addressed, with the drive 
for “security” coming to the fore post 9/11, requiring “affirmative action”, which some have 
distinguished from the terms “safety” and “surveillance”.17 While there has been recent 
acknowledgment of the issues that arise with regard to EU law enforcement data 
collection18, data protection in this area must be analysed in conjunction with the issue of 
data security. When these twin issues are analysed together, a very complex picture 
emerges, which should be re-examined in the post-Lisbon era. While Hijmans and Scirocco 
point out that “legal instruments facilitating the access to and exchange of information are 
a priority for the EU legislature”19, much still needs to be done to anticipate all possible 
scenarios that may arise, in order to both protect the individual from a data protection 
perspective and facilitate properly directed law enforcement operations across the EU. As 
can be seen from the sketched outline in the following table, both the data protection and 
data security regimes for the EU law enforcement agencies are highly fragmented.  
 
                       
6 de Hert, Papakonstantinou, The data protection framework decision of 27 November 2008 regarding police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – A modest achievement however not the improvement some 
have hoped for, 25 (2009) Computer Law & Security Review 403-414, p.403. 
7 ibid.  
8 Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An engine of a global regime, 24 (2008) Computer Law & Security 
Report 508-520, p.509. 
9 Kuner, An international legal framework for data protection: Issues and prospects, 25 (2009) Computer Law & 
Security Review 307-317, p.309. 
10 Birnhack, n8 above, p.508.  
11 Bundesverdassunsgericht, Judgment of 15 December 1983, 65 BVerfGE 1. 
12 Kuner, n9 above, p.308.  
13 Birnhack, n8 above, p.511.  
14 ibid.   
15 ibid.  
16 De Hert, Papakonstantinou, n6 above, p.404.  
17 ibid.  
18 In particular, H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco; Shortcomings in EU data protection in the third and the Second 
Pillars, Can the Lisbon Treaty be expected to help? CMLRev. 46: 1485-1525, 2009. 
19 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco, n4 above, p.1492. 
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Table 1: EU law enforcement data protection and data security overview 
 Data protection Data Protection 
Supervisor 
Data security standards 
Europol Europol Documentation 
(Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA) 
Europol Data Protection 
Officer, post- 2009 
reforms 
Council Decision 
2009/968/JHA 
Eurojust Eurojust Documentation 
(Council Decision 
2002/187/JHA, to be 
replaced by Council 
Decision 2009/426/JHA, 
when it comes into force) 
Eurojust Data Protection 
Officer since 2002 
Council Decision 2001/264/EC 
as amended 
Frontex  
(ex. EC) 
Regulation 45/2001 European Data 
Protection Supervisor 
None specified pre-reforms; 
Council Decision 2001/264/EC 
as amended, post-proposed 
Frontex reforms 
Schengen SIS I – none. 
SIS II – Articles 56 to 63 of 
Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA on the 
second generation of 
Schengen 
SIS I – none. 
SIS II - European Data 
Protection Supervisor  
None specified; presumably 
Council Decision 2001/264/EC 
as amended  
Prüm 
Council 
Decision 
National data protection 
laws 
National Data Protection 
Supervisors 
None specified 
Anything 
else ex. pre-
Lisbon third 
pillar 
CFD 2008/977/JHA National Data Protection 
Supervisors 
None specified 
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Caught between the panoptic demands20 of the surveillance society, in a world of 
increasing securitisation, and the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and domestic privacy laws, to include the needs of the criminal law for due process 
before ‘conviction’ for a criminal offence, data protection laws have been attempting to 
keep up with rapidly developing technology and the growth, for a variety of reasons, of 
complex and detailed databases. The precursor to EC and EU law in the area of data 
protection was the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. The definition of what is 
‘personal data’ is still being refined, with the EU’s Article 29 Working Committee, the “EU’s 
data protection think tank”21 often coming into conflict with national definitions of what is 
personal data, as was the case with the UK definition, as developed in the UK Court of 
Appeal ruling in Durant v. FSA.22 Nevertheless, much has been written about data 
protection laws implemented pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC23, which provides the legal 
framework for data protection in the first pillar of the EU, as it was known prior to the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty24, which specialises in commercial and civil law. 
More recently, the “complex relations between data protection and the activities of the 
State to ensure security” 25 has come to the fore in legal and political debates.  Policing and 
other security agencies use of data, which needs to be protected by data protection 
legislation, is also required by society to be used in order to prevent and combat crime. In 
addition, the particular needs of the law enforcement community for data security, which 
is also affected by security classification issues, is highly relevant. Post-Lisbon these allied 
issues, and the requirements for the inter-operability of EU law enforcement agencies, 
need to be re-examined. Both the law enforcement community and society more 
generally require coherent and acceptable data protection and data security legal 
frameworks across the EU, both for the interoperability of databases in combating crime 
and the protection of the individual citizen who is caught up, either innocently or 
otherwise, in a law enforcement operation. As has been stated by the US General 
Accounting Office, “inaccurate and incomplete data may lead to restrictive measures 
being adopted on innocent people (“false positives”), at the same time impinging on the 
capacity to effectively target their real addressees (“false negatives”).”26  
The legal frameworks of both the data protection and data security regimes in the area of 
law enforcement appear quite fragmented, as set out in Table 1 above. They lack a joined-
up approach which would increase their operability and the confidence of the general 
public in the system. In addition, the impact of both the regulatory authorities in this area 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are relevant. The coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty gives rise to opportunities to resolve a number of the issues discussed in this 
paper, should the EU Member States, and the various institutional actors in this field, 
choose to grasp this opportunity. What will become clear is that, as has been recognised 
by the Commission when drafting an amending regulation for Frontex27, an “overall 
strategy for information exchange”28 which is to be presented later in 2010, is required, 
which will take “into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop 
cooperation between Agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the 
                       
20 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (Penguin 1977). 
21 Grant, Data protection 1998-2008, 25 (2009) Computer Law & Security Review 44-50, p.45. 
22 2003 EWCA Civ. 1746. 
23 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OL L 
281/31. 
24 1st December 2009. 
25 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco, n4 above, at p.1493. 
26 ibid. at page 1511. 
27 Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, n2 above. 
28 ibid. at page 4 of the introduction. 
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Stockholm programme.”29 The same can be said about the data security provisions, which 
to even a non-security cleared outsider, without access to the relevant detail, look 
disjointed.  
This article intends to critically examine these issues of data protection and data security 
as they arise in the context of law enforcement within the various EU agencies, such as 
Europol30, Eurojust31, and through the Schengen Information System32, and to locate their 
provisions within the larger EU law enforcement picture.  
Data protection in the pre-Lisbon first pillar 
The most coherent legal framework on data protection has developed in the pre-Lisbon 
first pillar of the EU, pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC.33 It is to be interpreted on the basis 
that data protection rights are not absolute, but are to be balanced with other 
fundamental rights, which in the Promusicae case required the balancing of the data 
protection rights with the right “to the protection of property”.34 This is despite the fact 
that the right to data protection is expressly provided for in Article 8 of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights 2000. If the right to data protection, and its ancillary right to privacy 
can be counterbalanced by a right to property under the EC commercial law 
jurisprudence, then the right to data protection and privacy will all the more be 
compromised by the needs of the law enforcement community in legitimate crime 
detection and crime prevention activities. At the other end of the scale, as stated by Peers, 
the right to data protection would also appear to have to defer to “the right of freedom of 
expression and the right of access to documents” on the basis of the “democratic society” 
principle, which “would point towards the release of information concerning lobbying of 
public authorities and MEP’s private interests”.35 In addition, in the pre-Lisbon Neukomm 
and Rundfunk judgement36, the ECJ was prepared to compromise the right to data 
protection for the sake of the “proper management of public funds”37, where the names of 
recipients of personal remuneration over a particular high threshold paid from the public 
purse were to be widely disclosed, as well as the amount of their remuneration. The data 
protection directive was interpreted in “light of Article 8 ECHR including the prospect of 
limitations under Article 8(2)”.38 References were made in the case to “Strasbourg case law 
and principles” to include “the specific objectives justifying a limitation on the right, the 
requirement that limits be ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the 
Strasbourg proportionality test and the margin of appreciation”.39 The right to data 
protection, therefore, is not an “absolute prerogative and can be subject to restrictions in 
the general interest”.40 It is only the “right to life and the right to be free from torture or 
                       
29 ibid. at page 4/5 of the introduction. 
30 Europol Convention 1995, but to be replaced by the Europol Council Decision 2009/371/JHAof 6 April 2009 
establishing the Europol Police Office (Europol), OJ L 121/6, which came into force on the 1st January 2010. 
31 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, OJ L 63/1. 
32 Schengen Convention 1990. 
33 Directive 95/46/EC, n23 above. 
34 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefόnica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-271. 
35 S. Peers: Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations, p. 141, Chapter 6 in Steve Peers and Angela Ward 
(eds.) The EU charter of fundamental rights politics, law and policy, essays in European Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2004, p.168. 
36 Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01; Neukomm and Rundfunk [2003] ECR page I-04989. 
37 At paragraphs 50 and 94 of the Judgment, and paragraph 1 of the ruling. 
38 S.Peers, n35 above, p.144. 
39 ibid. p.144. 
40 ibid. p.143. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” which can be seen to be absolute and 
non-derogable.41 
The pre-Lisbon legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was “something 
paradoxical”42, given its status as “soft law”43, not having any formal legal effect, being 
“merely a political statement”44, but still having a profound effect on the operation of the 
EU in general, and the jurisprudence of the ECJ in particular. As Cartabia has pointed out, 
the Charter had given a new lease of life to the “creative ability of the European Court” pre-
Lisbon.45 This creative ability of the ECJ will continue to be relevant in the post-Lisbon 
framework, with the post-Lisbon Article 6.1 TEU upgrading the Charter to the same legal 
status as the Treaties.46 It must be pointed out however, that this upgrading of the Charter 
is subject to a UK and Polish opt-out47, to the extent that the Charter “will not be justiciable 
in British courts or alter British law”.48 The UK was, however, party to the “solemn 
proclamation at the Nice European Council of December 2000” which, according to Ward, 
“amounts to persuasive evidence in determining the content of fundamental rights that 
are judicially enforceable in the EU system”.49 The extent to which the UK and Polish opt-
out from Article 6.1 TEU, post-Lisbon but still subject to the effect of the “solemn 
proclamation” at Nice, will have an effect on the impact of ECJ jurisprudence on these two 
Member States, to which they are still bound, has yet to be established. In addition, pre-
Lisbon the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has already been set up50 
under the pre-Lisbon framework and the ECJ had already adjudicated on Directive 
95/46/EC, using, not Article 8 of the EU Charter, but Article 8 ECHR.51  
Article 16 TFEU expressly provides a treaty provision for data protection regulation post-
Lisbon. This article provides little detail, however, apart from stating at Article 16.1 that 
“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them”. It does 
provide that the provisions in Article 16 are to be “without prejudice to the specific rules 
laid down in Article 39” TEU, which deals with data protection within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 16 TFEU does become subject to Article 6a of UK and 
Ireland’s post-Lisbon Schengen Protocol,52 which, quite logically provides that any data 
protection provisions adopted with regard to judicial cooperation and police cooperation 
which forms part of the Schengen acquis, which either country has not subsequently 
opted into, will not apply to them. A similar “even more complicated”53 Schengen relevant 
derogation has also been provided for Denmark in its post-Lisbon Schengen protocol.54 
                       
41 ibid. referring to the Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR p.I-05659 
42 M. Cartabia: Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously, European Constitutional Law Review, 5: 5-31, 
2009, p.15. 
43 J. Dine; Criminal Law and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, p. 269, Chapter 11 in Steve Peers and 
Angela Ward (eds.) The EU charter of fundamental rights politics, law and policy, essays in European Law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2004, p.270. 
44 M. Cartabia, n42 above, p.15. 
45 ibid. p.8. 
46 As elaborated further in Protocol (No. 8) Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the 
accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, attached to both the TEU and the TFEU. 
47 Protocol (No. 30) on the application of the charter of fundamental rights of the European Union to Poland 
and to the United Kingdom, attached to both the TEU and the TFEU. 
48 F. Ferretti, “The “Credit Scoring Pandemic” and the European Vaccine: Making Sense of EU Data Protection 
Legislation, 2009 (1) Journal of Information, Law & Technology, p.11. 
49 A. Ward; Access to Justice, p. 123, Chapter 5 in Steve Peers and Angela Ward (eds.) The EU charter of 
fundamental rights politics, law and policy, essays in European Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 
Oregon, 2004, p.127. 
50 Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007 of 15 February 2007, OJ L 53/2 22.2.2007. 
51 Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01; Neukomm and Rundfunk [2003] ECR page I-04989. 
52 Protocol (No. 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. 
53 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco, n4 above, p.1516. 
54 Article 7 of Protocol (No 22) on the Position of Denmark. 
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The drafting of updates to the EU data protection provisions, therefore, needs to be clear 
on whether it is to form part of the core EU provisions, or to be subject to the various 
continuing Schengen opt-out provisions. Nevertheless, it is fair to say, that the Lisbon 
Treaty “improves the judicial protection of citizens”55 for pre-Lisbon second and third pillar 
issues. As has been pointed out by Hijmans and Scirocco, this will happen, in particular, 
“after the expiry of the transitional period of 5 years” set out in Protocol no. 36 attached to 
the TEU and TFEU, which “despite” the provision contained in Protocol no. 30, “on the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to 
the United Kingdom”.56  
Directive 95/46/EC has been complemented by Regulation 45/200157 to provide data 
protection to “data subjects” when their data is being processed by EC institutions and 
bodies. Frontex, a pillar I law enforcement agency provides58 that Regulation 45/2001 is to 
apply to its processing of personal data. Article 8.3 of the 2000 Charter requires that 
“compliance with these [data protection] rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority”. Such an authority is the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) whose position was established by Regulation 45/2001/EC.59  
This coherent structure set up for Pillar I activities, to include Pillar I law enforcement 
activities, was not transferred to Pillar III Police and Judicial Co-operation (PJCCM) 
activities, which of itself becomes an issue in the post-Lisbon framework. Both previous 
pillars have now been reintegrated into the unitary post-Lisbon treaty framework, all be it 
with continuing exceptions for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which 
now has its own data protection provisions under Article 39 TEU. “Public security, defence, 
state security…. and the activities of the State in the areas of criminal law” were expressly 
provided as exceptions to Directive 95/46/EC60, as were the activities of “Titles V and VI of 
the Treaty on European Union”61, i.e. the then CFSP and PJCCM policy areas. Equally, 
standard data protection rules could be curtailed where data originally collected for non-
law enforcement matters were now required for law enforcement purposes, to include 
taxation matters.62 A clear division between the commercial and law enforcement data 
protection activities had always been envisaged. In addition, the EDPS did not, in the pre-
Lisbon framework, have competence to supervise the activities of “bodies established 
outside the Community framework”.63 A fractured structure develops when the provisions 
of the pre-Lisbon third pillar is examined. Now that the PJCCM agencies are to be brought 
into the post-Lisbon EU framework, their data protection and data security provisions 
need to be re-examined.  
Not only were PJCCM policy areas more politically contentious than perhaps those in the 
EC pillar, but “police information is something completely different”64 from data processed 
by the private sector for commercial purposes. As pointed out by de Hert and 
Papakonstantinou, police data can often, until an investigation develops, be “based on 
uncertain facts or on assumptions and hearsay”, which does not match the nature of hard 
                       
55 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco, n4 above, p.1523. 
56 ibid.  
57 Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 8/1. 
58 At paragraph 19 to the preamble to Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, OJ L 349/1. 
59 Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001, n57 above, at Articles 41 to 48.  
60 Directive 95/46/EC, n.23 above, at Article 3.2 first indent. 
61 ibid. at Article 3.2 first indent. 
62 ibid. at Article 13.1. 
63 Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001, n57 above, at paragraph 16 of the Preamble.  
64 De Hert, Papakonstantinou, n6 above, p.408. 
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data covered by the mainstream data protection directive.65 While the pillar issues may 
have been resolved by the Lisbon Treaty, the nature of data being used in law 
enforcement operations remains quite different to commercial data post-Lisbon and will 
probably continue to require a separate legal regime.  
In addition, the issue of data security comes squarely into the picture when dealing with 
police intelligence and covert surveillance ‘data’. While provisions are made in Regulation 
45/2001 to deal with issues of professional secrecy by the EDPS “with regard to any 
confidential information which has come to their knowledge in the course of the 
performance of their official duties”66, this is not quite the same issue as the law 
enforcement security classifications covered in Council Act of 3 November 199867, which 
deals with Europol data security classifications. 
Provisions were made for data security provisions in the EC, and throughout the EU, but 
outwith Europol, by Council Decision 2001/264/EC68 as subsequently amended.69 While 
some of these provisions focus on industrial security, namely Council Decision 
2005/952/EC, it is clear that national security is also covered, with the EU classifications of 
“EU Top Secret”, “EU Secret”, “EU Confidential” and “EU restricted” being mapped, not only 
against national security classifications of the EU Member States, but also those of the 
military organisations of NATO and the Western European Union.70 The proposed reform 
of the Frontex legal framework will make express reference to the application of 
Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom, which brings with it the security 
classification regime set out in Council Decision 2001/264/EC.71 
The pre-Lisbon third pillar: the ‘standard’ rules 
While accepting that policing relating data may require a separate legal regime from the 
one being used for commercial data, but reflecting “the tension between the quest for 
effectiveness on the one hand and the preservation of state sovereignty on the other”72, it 
is regrettable to note that there is not one policing data protection regime, but many. 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA73 appears to give a unitary response to the 
issue of data protection for EU law enforcement activities, but its provisions are subject to 
so many exceptions that the question does arise as to its actual applicability. The 
Framework Decision, which is deemed to form part of the Schengen acquis74, purports to 
provide “a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of national 
persons, in particular their right to privacy”75 for PJCCM related data processing. However, 
                       
65 ibid.   
66 Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001, n57 above, at Article 45. . 
67 Council Act of 3 November 1998 adopting rules on the confidentiality of Europol information 1999 OJ C 
316/1. 
68 Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations, OJ L 101/1. 
69 Council Decision 2004/194/EC of 10 February 2004 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s 
security regulations, (2004/194/EC) OJ L 63/48, Council Decision of 12 July 2005 amending Decision 
2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations (2005/571/EC), OJ L 193/1, Council Decision of 20 
December 2005 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations (2005/952/EC), 
OJ L 346/18, and Council Decision of 18 June 2007 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s 
security regulations, (2007/438/EC),OJ L 164/24. 
70 ibid.  
71 Proposed new Article 11.b at point 15 of Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, n2 above. 
72 V. Mitsilegas; The third wave of third pillar law. Which direction for EU criminal justice, E.L.Rev. 2009, 34(4), 
523-560, p.560. 
73 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350/60. 
74 With not only the UK and Ireland opting into these provisions, but also involving Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland and Lichtenstein.  
75 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, n.73 above, at Article 1.  
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its actual scope is “very limited”.76 As one would expect, the “transmission of personal data 
by the judiciary, police or customs (…) in the context of criminal proceedings” is 
excluded.77 The issue of data protection in the case of law enforcement activities solely 
within one Member State remains a matter for individual Member States to address.78 
While the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA provisions are not only “without 
prejudice to essential national security interests and specific intelligence activities in the 
field of national security”79 which may be across EU borders80, also exempted are the “data 
protection provisions of (…) Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS) and 
the Customs Information System (CIS)”.81 Paragraph 39 of the Preamble also removes from 
its ambit data being processed pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, the Prüm 
Decision82, which applies (only) to all EU Member States. As has been pointed out, “it is 
questionable how these limitations are to work in practice”.83 In addition, for Framework 
Decision 2008/977 to apply, it must be foreseeable, “at the moment of the collection of 
personal data by a police authority” that the “data might at a later stage be used in a cross-
border context”.84 Police enquiries often develop in unexpected directions, so it would 
appear that it is only planned transnational operations that were envisaged as being the 
subject matter of this Framework Decision, which are not to use any of the EU 
transnational policing structures. While the intention behind the Framework Decision was 
to develop a more comprehensive legal framework than what eventually emerged, its 
precursor “negotiations proved lengthy and controversial”, with EU Member States 
making “a number of attempts to water down the text” and tabling “a number of 
[amending] proposals”.85 De Hert and Papakonstantinou point out that the Framework 
Decision “attempted to strike an admittedly difficult to find balance between instruments 
already in effect and their provisions”. The resulting legal provisions in Framework 
Decision 2008/977 is such that Hijmans and Scirocco are of the view that it “does not fulfil 
the criteria of Article 16 TFEU”, thereby placing and obligation on the EU legislators “to 
replace it by a new legislative instrument.”86 It is argued here that the entire data 
protection and data security structure needs to be reviewed. 
The data protection and security regime at Europol     
The agency that has led the way in dealing with law enforcement issues at the EU level is 
Europol. The Europol Convention 1995 was necessarily drafted against the backdrop of a 
legal framework on data protection, and transnational law enforcement which is now 
outdated, when compared with the provisions of the recent Europol Council Decision.87 
The Europol Convention had been updated by three Protocols88, and a number of Council 
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acts.89 The Europol Council Decision, which moves the focus from organised crime to 
serious crime, thereby “broadening Europol’s mandate”90, takes into account these various 
updated pieces of legislation in its drafting of a new legal framework for Europol. The 
general EU principle of public access to documentation, as set out in Regulation (EC) No. 
1049/200191, while enshrined in the Europol Council Decision92, has to be understood 
against the backdrop of Europol data protection, data security and security classification 
provisions.  
The key function of Europol is the processing of data for the purposes of crime prevention 
and enforcement, with the new Europol legal basis providing for the “intensification of 
data collection, analysis and exchange”, which is to be allied to a “new system” for the 
processing of data”.93 Data protection provisions at Europol would therefore cover a very 
high volume of personal data which is being processed in the context of law enforcement. 
The use of personal data at Europol, under the Council Decision, is therefore restricted for 
the purposes of preventing and combating “crimes in respect of which Europol is 
competent, and [preventing and combating] other serious forms of crime” with Europol 
being empowered to use such data “only for the performance of its tasks.”94 The Council 
Decision does, however, increase the time limit for data storage to “three plus three 
years”.95 The Council Decision also envisages greater access to Europol data by national 
Europol units, access by outside experts to Europol analysis work files, for example US law 
enforcement agencies for relevant cases or operations, and access to data relevant to 
them, to a diverse range of other agencies and bodies,96 to include third states and 
Interpol.97 
A control mechanism has been put in place “to allow the verification of the legality of 
retrievals from any of its automated data files”98 with all such requests being logged, and 
audited upon request99 by Europol, its National Supervisory Bodies100, and the Joint 
Supervisory Body.101 The roles of the National and Joint Supervisory Bodies remain 
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essentially the same as those which operated under the Europol Convention 1995, with 
“any person” having the right to ask his or her national supervisory body to “ensure that 
the input or communication to Europol of data concerning him or her in any form and the 
consultation of the data by the Member State concerned are lawful”102, with that right to 
be “exercised in accordance with the national law of the Member State in which the 
request is made”.103 The Joint Supervisory Body is more interested in the processes used 
by Europol, with their role being to “review (…) the activities of Europol” ensuring that 
individual rights “are not violated by the storage, processing and use of the data held by 
Europol”.104 The Joint Supervisory Body is also to ensure that the transfer of data to other 
organisations from Europol is permissible.105 Should the Joint Supervisory Body identify 
any violations in “the storage, processing or use of personal data”, then it will require the 
Director of Europol to address the issue within a set time limit.106 
The standard of data protection continues to be those of the Council of Europe107, rather 
than the standards set out in Directive 95/46/EC108 or even Regulation 45/2001.109 Equally, 
no reference is made to Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA110, which one would 
assume must have been familiar to the drafters of the 2009 Europol Council Decision.111 It 
is possible, however, that different teams were responsible for drafting various pieces of 
legislation, hence the lack of joined-up thinking evident from their comparative analysis. 
The standard rule on data protection at Europol, under the Council Decision, is that data 
shall only be held “for as long as is necessary” for Europol to perform its tasks112, with data 
to be reviewed every three years, with “Europol [to] automatically inform the Member 
States three months in advance of the expiry of the time limits for reviewing the storage of 
data”.113  
A new development at Europol is the appointment of a data protection officer114, who, 
while being a member of staff of Europol, is to act independently. He or she will “have 
access to all the data processed by Europol and to all Europol premises”115, so presumably 
the data protection officer will have all the necessary clearances to review top secret as 
well as other secret, confidential and restricted materials held at Europol, as classified by 
Council Act of 3 November 1998116, as amended117, in order to properly comply with this 
requirement. The Europol Data Protection Officer is required, inter alia, to cooperate with 
the Joint Supervisory Body in fulfilling his tasks, and it would be expected from their joint 
responsibility on data protection matters, and the protection of individuals, that this 
relationship with the Joint Supervisory Body would be quite close. Nevertheless, the 
individual complaints on personal data being processed by Europol would still be directed 
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to the relevant National Supervisory Body. All parties entering data onto the Europol data 
processing systems remain responsible for ensuring, both from a data protection 
perspective, and law enforcement perspective, that data entered is correct, and also 
complies with rules on the legality of the collection of that data, as well as the rules on the 
“storage time limits” of that data.118  
Data security provisions within Europol were initially set out in Article 25 of the Europol 
Convention, now Article 35 of the Europol Council Decision, and has been supplemented 
by a number of secondary legal instruments. In addition, the Europol Council Decision 
now expressly refers to the EU system of classified information in Article 46, requiring 
Europol to “apply the security principles and minimum standards set out in Council 
Decision 2001/264/EC119 with regard to EU classified information, which has since been 
amended.120 The issue of the confidentiality of information, with the allocation of 
classifications Europol 1, 2 and 3 being allocated to what both the UK and Ireland would 
classify as “confidential”, “secret” and “top secret”, was originally covered in Council Act of 
3 November 1998.121 The “confidential” classification was then sub-divided in 2003 to 
cover a “Europol Restricted” and a “Europol Confidential” classification level, with the new 
default classification to be “Europol Unclassified not for public dissemination”.122 The 
purpose for this re-alignment of security classifications in 2003 was in order “that they 
correspond as far as possible to the levels currently applied within the institutions of the 
European Union and to existing international standards”.123 The EU-wide classification 
standards, which does not include Europol, had been put in place pursuant to Council 
Decision 2001/264/EC,124 and has been subsequently amended and elaborated upon.125 In 
addition, Europol has developed its own security manual.126  
Member states providing the data to Europol select the security classification appropriate 
for the information127, taking into account both the need for “operational flexibility” within 
Europol, as well as “the classification of the information under (…) national regulations”.128 
All information between 2003, and up to and including 2009, was normally given the 
marking “Europol Unclassified not for public dissemination” unless a classification level 
had been assigned to it.129 This situation is now dealt with by ensuring that “all information 
processed by or through Europol” is “subject to a basic protection level within Europol and 
in the Member States”, unless such information “is expressly marked or is clearly 
recognisable as being public information”.130 Higher classifications are to be “assigned (…) 
only where strictly necessary and for the time necessary”131, “taking account of the 
detrimental effect which unauthorised access, dissemination or use of the information 
might have on the interests of Europol or the Member States.”132 Packages of information 
can be classified together, with the highest classification of an individual piece of 
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information in the package, applying to the package of information as a whole.133 In 
addition, it is possible for a package of information to be given a higher classification than 
the sum of its parts.  
Europol may come “to the conclusion that the choice of classification level needs 
changing” and will, in such a case, “inform the Member State concerned” with a view to 
obtaining agreement to such change.134 In the event that agreement to the change is not 
forthcoming, Europol has no power to “specify, change, add or remove a classification 
level without such agreement”.135 If Europol manages to generate its own information, it 
will obtain consent from the Member State which provided the basic information as to the 
classification level to be applied to the information.136 If there was no such basic 
information from a Member State, Europol will determine itself which security 
classification applies to the information.137 Amendments of classification levels is also 
possible, as information gains a greater or lesser importance as operations develop, with 
the member state supplying the information maintaining control over its security 
classification.138 
At Europol, the security of data is controlled by the Europol Security Committee, 
“consisting of representatives of the Member States and of Europol”139, the Security 
Coordinator140 who is “directly answerable to the Director of Europol”, and security 
officers.141 The Security Coordinator is to hold “security clearance to the highest level 
under the regulations applicable in the Member State of which the Security Coordinator is 
a national”.142 This security clearance level will now have to cover those levels of relevance 
to counter-terrorism operations. The 2009 reforms bring in provisions for a number of 
security officers, more than the original one, under the 1998 regulations, who are now to 
“be security cleared to the appropriate level required by their duties” in accordance with 
“the laws and regulations applicable in the Member States of which they are a national”.143 
All of these structures operate within the framework set down in the security manual144, 
which was adopted “by the Management Board after consultation with the Security 
Committee”.145 The processing of data by Europol will only be done by people who “by 
reason of their duties or obligations, need to be acquainted with such information or to 
handle it”146 and who have obtained “an appropriate security clearance and shall further 
receive special training”.147 Subject to a veto by the supplying Member State,148 an 
exception to the strict security clearance rules can be granted by the Security Coordinator, 
after consulting a security officer, and following the specified exceptions laid down in the 
Council Decision. This exception is limited to access to EU secret material, where their 
security clearance only grants them access to EU confidential material. This could be, for 
reason that “if, by reason of their duties or obligation, in a specific case,”149 a particular 
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individual needs “to have access to specific information classified up to Secret UE/EU 
Secret”.150  
While the new security classification system is now in place for EU activities, to include 
military activities, Europol continues to maintain a separate classification system pursuant 
to the 1998 Council Act, as amended. The requirement on Europol is to maintain at least 
the standards as used by the rest of the EU.151 Presumably Europol is of the view that its 
standards are higher, in order to maintain a separate classification regime. The issues here 
are not so much the over-interconnectedness of databases, but the lack of such 
connections, due to different data security provisions, with intelligence, for example, 
collected by Frontex on trafficking in human beings by organised crime across the 
external border of the EU, not being shareable with organised crime police who share their 
intelligence via Europol. The connections between Europol and Eurojust are similarly 
fractured. While commercially collected data may well become available to law 
enforcement officers, law enforcement data is highly controlled, and will not, at least 
without a criminal offence having been committed by somebody legitimately in 
possession of such data, become available for other purposes.  
At some point, interoperability of databases and inter-agency collaboration in law 
enforcement activities needs to be facilitated. The proposed reforms to Fontex152, a 
traditional pillar I law enforcement body, will give an express but limited mandate to 
process personal data “related to the fight against criminal networks organising illegal 
immigration”.153 It will also be given its own Data Protection Officer.154 The entirety of 
Frontex operations are to be under the supervision of the European Data Protection 
Officer155 and operate under the EU provisions on data security, 156 rather than the Europol 
ones.157 One can only ask as how effectively data can be exchanged in this emerging 
situation between Europol and Frontex in areas of overlapping operational competence 
and interest, while still meeting the requirements of data protection due to the data 
subject. 
The changes brought in by the Lisbon Treaty should not make any significant difference to 
the Europol data protection and security classification system, with the exception that 
future updates of the Europol legal framework may well be through Regulation. Worth 
commenting on, however, is the ability for Europol to operate within a full data protection 
regime, with the appointment of an independent data protection officer, something that 
Eurojust was in a position to deal with some years ago, but had been problematic for the 
law enforcement community for so many years. If Europol is now in a position to have its 
own data protection officer, why then is there not a coherent unified data protection 
framework for all law enforcement provisions, recognising that the data protection 
provisions originally designed for pillar I EC activities may not be the most appropriate 
structure for transferral to policing activities. 
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The data protection and security regime at Eurojust    
At some point in an investigation, both Europol and Frontex will want to engage the 
services of Eurojust in their operations. Set up as the partner organisation to Europol, 
Eurojust was created pursuant to Council Decision 2002/187/JHA158, and had, from its very 
beginning, provisions on data protection159 and security160, to include the provisions for its 
own “specially appointed Data Protection Officer, who shall be a member of the staff”161, a 
provision which the Europol reforms have just provided for, and the proposed reforms to 
Frontex will also cover. Eurojust, which calls itself the network for investigating and 
prosecuting magistrates, but which also has a role for senior police officers when they are 
allocated the role of leading police investigations in a particular jurisdiction162, was 
updated pursuant to Council Decision 2003/659/JHA.163 This deals with its budgetary and 
financial provisions. Eurojust is about to be much more substantially revised pursuant to 
Council Decision 2009/426/JHA164, which is to come into force “no later than 4 June 
2011”.165 Much of the original provisions on data protection and data security continue 
unaltered by the 2009 Council Decision. The capacity for Eurojust to engage in data 
“collection, processing and exchange” has however “been extended quite 
considerably”.166 A new Article 39a has been inserted into the Eurojust legal framework, 
dealing with classified information, with Eurojust to adopt the “security principles and 
minimum standards” of the EU security classification system, as set out in Council Decision 
2001/264/EC167 discussed above, and not those being used by its partner institution, 
Europol. If indeed there is a difference between the EU and Europol security classification 
frameworks, and if Eurojust, after the coming into force of the 2009 Council Decision is to 
provide a 27/4 legal advice service to Europol (and possibly also to Frontex), with the role 
of senior investigating police officers and investigating magistrates being serviced by the 
Eurojust legal framework, rather than that of Europol, why then is Eurojust taking a 
different line on these issues than Europol? These two organisations need to work more 
closely together than does Eurojust with any other law enforcement framework or body. 
This has been recognised by the fact that Eurojust and Europol have been co-located at 
The Hague. In addition, both Eurojust and Europol could be involved in joint investigation 
teams, set up by the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters. An 
opportunity to align the two organisations in a more streamlined fashion would appear to 
have been missed in the drafting of the two 2009 Council Decisions on Europol and 
Eurojust. 
Data protection and security issues relating to the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
Cross-EU law enforcement activities are not limited to the activities of the EU’s law 
enforcement agencies. Point to point law enforcement contact between EU Member 
States is facilitated by the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is also known as 
SIRENE. The SIS has been set up to meet the needs of both visas, asylum, etc. issues and 
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policing matters, with the UK and Ireland only using the system for policing matters, with 
the rest of the EU using the system for policing and visas, asylum, etc. issues.  
The provisions on data protection and data security for the SIS were drafted in 1990. They 
are comprised in Articles 102 to 118 of the Schengen Convention, with no reference being 
made to data protection officers, security classifications, or many of the newer provisions 
dealing with data protection and data security. Reference is made in Article 119 to the 
1981 Council of Europe Convention168 and to supporting Council of Europe materials. No 
attempt appears to have been made over the years to update the SIS I legal framework. 
However, with the development of the new SIS II information system, a new legal 
framework has been put in place.169 The SIS II is to come into force when “the necessary 
technical and legal arrangements” have been put in place.170 While it would appear that 
the legal frameworks have been in place for some time, there has been some delay from a 
technical point of view in getting the computer system to work. If and when the SIS II 
formally comes into operation, data security provisions will be found in Article 10 for 
Member States, and Article 16 for the whole system, with data protection provisions to be 
found in Articles 56 to 63.  
An interesting development with regard to data protection for SIS II is the use of the 
(commercially focused) European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)171, who in 
conjunction with the national data protection supervisors, will “ensure coordinated 
supervision of SIS II.”172 There is no separate reference to security classifications in SIS II, 
which is also of interest, as terrorism had been added to the SIS capability.173 Counter-
terrorism information has been part of the SIS framework since 2005.174 From an outsider’s 
viewpoint, this would bring with it security classification issues. Presumably the new EU-
wide security classification system175 now applies to SIS I and to SIS II as and when it comes 
into operation. If the argument for hiving off the policing provisions from the mainstream 
EC Data Protection structure was because policing essentially uses different types of data 
in different ways from that of the commercial world, an argument that this writer is 
prepared to accept176, why then is the policing part of the SIS under the control of the 
“commercially focused” EDPS? Has the EDPS gone through the various security clearance 
requirements to render an effective service to citizens on the subject of high level 
classified information? If the EDPS is in a position to render an effective service, why then 
has Europol and Eurojust been hived off into – different from each other – packages of 
information, to be separately monitored for data protection purposes?  
In this writer’s opinion, the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA177 was a missed 
opportunity to develop a coherent and standardised data protection and data security 
classification framework for the entirety of the cross-border EU law enforcement 
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framework. If that could not have been achieved, then at least Europol and Eurojust should 
have been better aligned, at the highest level, in order to ensure a free flow of information 
between the two organisations, without data protection and security classification issues 
having the potential, at any time, to hinder that flow of information, while still creating a 
coherent structure giving the necessary protection to the data subject. 
Data protection and security issues relating to the Prüm Decision   
The above complex and fractured framework for both data protection and data security is 
added to by further legal provisions such as those contained in the recently enacted Prüm 
Council Decision178, which was based on the preceding Treaty of Prüm. This piece of 
legislation was passed in controversial circumstances, with the EDPS gaining an even more 
forceful voice within the EU, being in a position to issue a “detailed opinion”179 on the 
development, which was enacted before the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA.180 The EDPS was very critical of the then lack of “a general rule on data 
protection in the third pillar”.181 Writing now, after the passing of the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA, problems remain, as the Prüm Decision182 relies on “local and 
possibly inconsistent data protection laws”183, based on the Council of Europe 
Convention.184 The Prüm Council Decision was drafted, primarily by Germany, and was 
presented in controversial circumstances “without an explanatory memorandum, an 
impact assessment, nor an estimate of the cost to Member States, or time for proper 
consultation with Member States and the European Parliament”.185 There is no surprise, 
therefore, that there is a gap in what needs to be a coherent legal framework for data 
protection and data security issues for the purposes of cross-border EU law enforcement.   
Not only has no attempt been made for Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA to amend the 
Prüm Decision, but at paragraph 39 of the preamble, it expressly states that the Prüm 
Decision “should not be affected by this framework decision”. An opportunity to close a 
gap in the protection of personal data, as identified by the EDPS, would appear to have 
been missed. While provision is made for the confidentiality186 and security of 
processing187 of personal data, it is interesting to note that no reference is made to security 
classification. This is despite the fact that the Prüm Decision also covers the “supply of 
information in order to prevent terrorist offences”.188 No reference is made in either 
Council Decision 2008/977/JHA, or its implementing decision Council Decision 
2008/616/JHA189, to data security classifications. Presumably the default provision in 
Council Decision 2001/264/EC with regard to the Council’s security regulations would 
apply in this case.190 
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Other provisions on data in the pre-Lisbon third pillar 
There have been some efforts to develop some joined-up thinking in the area of law 
enforcement, with the development of a joint data protection secretariat being set up 
between Europol, the Customs Information System (CIS),191 and the Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) in Council Decision 2000/641/JHA.192 One could ask why this joint 
development was not between Europol and Eurojust, who were both located within the 
same legal framework, and in the same town, when organisations based in different EU 
legal pillars could manage to develop this secretariat. No reference is made to classified 
information in this Council Decision, although presumably classified information would 
have to be transferred between Europol, the CIS and the SIS, who, by the way, have 
different data security provisions, as discussed above. The role of the joint data protection 
secretariat is to provide support to the joint supervisory bodies of Europol, the CIS and the 
SIS, and to fulfil “the tasks provided for the joint supervisory bodies as laid down in the 
respective Rules of Procedure of those bodies”.193  
Further data exchange between the EU Member States194 is also facilitated by Council 
Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA195, which provides for the exchange of criminal record 
information. This document is deigned to supplement the EU Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000.196 Reference is made197 to the Council of Europe 
Convention on data processing 1981, and to “fundamental rights” as set out in the pre-
Lisbon Article 6 of the TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.198 However, as the 2000 Convention was not expressly excluded from Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA199, it would appear that the default PJCCM provisions 
on data protection apply in this instance. Specific provisions on security classifications are 
not made in Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, so the default EU provisions on 
data security classification would also appear to apply.200 The above legal framework is 
added to by Council Decision 2009/316/JHA201 which establishes a European Criminal 
Records Information System (ECRIS). 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is an interestingly titled document “on 
simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States of the European Union”.202 It does not, however, cover in 
any great detail, the subject matter of this paper. Also applicable to Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland, the intention behind Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA was to 
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improve cross-border communication by police like agencies across the EU, excluding the 
intelligence services203, which remain outside the EU legal framework, even post-Lisbon. It 
does not prevent earlier or future provisions going further than the provisions of this 
Framework Directive.204 While reference is made to confidentiality205, no express mention 
is made to data security classification. Data protection issues are given greater coverage, 
with the first reference in legislation to the need to “strike [an] appropriate balance 
between fast and efficient law enforcement cooperation”206 and “data protection, 
fundamental freedoms, human rights and individual liberties”.207 The Framework Decision 
is to be without prejudice to “bilateral or multilateral agreements (…) between Member 
States and third countries”208 or agreements amongst EU member states on “mutual legal 
assistance or mutual recognition”,209 and is not to modify any rights or legal principles 
enshrined in the pre-Lisbon Article 6 EU.210 What the Framework Decision does provide is 
that “established rules on data protection”, whatever they are supposed to be, should be 
used when exchanging “information and intelligence provided for by this Framework 
Decision.”211 The only transnational laws referred to in this particular Framework Decision 
are those of the Council of Europe.212 In effect, national laws on data protection are to be 
applied in operating the provisions of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. No 
reference is made to any of the other EU data protection or data security provisions when 
exchanging information and intelligence under this Framework Decision. 
Operating as a stand-alone measure, not connected to any of the above is Council 
Decision 2005/671/JHA.213 This legal document provides procedures to be followed in 
exchanging terrorist-related data, either via Europol or Eurojust,214 but, again strangely, no 
reference is made in this document to either data protection or data security provisions. As 
these are the only two methods of transmission of data under this Council Decision, then 
the data protection and data security provisions of these two organisations, which differ in 
both respects, would apply, depending on the channels of communication used.  
Prospects for future post-Lisbon cooperation and conclusion 
Society is best served by more effective targeting of law enforcement activities, which is 
facilitated by improved intelligence. Intelligence is more than information, but is about 
targeting better available resources215, with “policing beginning to think more 
strategically”.216 Intelligence should lead to “informed decision making”217, allowing for the 
“targeting of offenders” as the “best way to use our scarce police resources”.218 A better 
streamlining of the structures facilitating the sharing of data between the law 
enforcements authorities across the EU, now that the relevant general principles have 
been conceded by national authorities, can be facilitated not only by structural innovation 
such as Europol and the Schengen Information System, but also through a more coherent 
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data security regime, married with a more coherent data protection regime, for the 
protection of the individual caught up in a law enforcement investigation. As stated by the 
EDPS, in the context of EU frontier databases, “The sheer number of these proposals and 
the seemingly piecemeal way in which they are put forward make it extremely difficult for 
the stakeholders (European and national Parliaments, data protection authorities 
including EDPS, civil society) to have a full overview”. 219 Exactly the same can be said for 
the law enforcement data protection and data security structures within the EU, from the 
point of view of both the data subject and the law enforcement professional. The EDPS 
called for “evidence that there is a master plan for all these initiatives, giving a clear sense 
of direction”.220 In this writer’s opinion, a master plan for the law enforcement data 
protection and data security structures also needs to be written, and is now capable of 
being written under the post-Lisbon Treaty framework.  
Some would argue that the development of cross-EU law enforcement provisions in the 
absence of cross-EU criminal defence provisions is an error, with Dine pointing out that the 
“relationship between national criminal law, EU criminal provisions, the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the impact of the Charter [is] likely to fuel a 
highly complex debate.”221 It may well be that the post-Lisbon Article 6.1 TEU upgrading 
the formal status of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 2000 to the same legal status as 
the Treaties, together with Article 6.2 TEU’s provisions on the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, will prove to be the green light 
for the ECJ to develop an effective jurisprudence in this area. That, however, is an issue for 
another paper.  
This article has focussed on the much narrower issue of data protection and data security, 
both of which have already been legislated for in the area of cross-border EU law 
enforcement, with both showing fissures in the EU legal framework which need to be 
addressed. As stated by Mitsilegas, the “proliferation of data collection mechanisms” 222 has 
“not been accompanied by a coherent framework for the protection of personal data and 
privacy”.223 The different drafting teams, over different time periods, have established hard 
fought for principles, against the background of the difficult legal tools that were available 
in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. With the decanting of the third pillar into the post-Lisbon 
unitary EU pillar, the possibility of streamlining the legal framework in this area becomes a 
reality. As Mitsilegas has pointed out, “the aim of reaching a coherent data protection legal 
framework for the exchange of information in criminal matters is far from being 
achieved”.224 Similar issues arise with regard to data security classifications.  
Over time a variety of principles appear to have been accepted, to include the need for 
data protection supervision of active policing data, as evidenced by the provisions in the 
Europol Council Decision. This now appears to be feasible, despite the high levels of 
security classification necessary at times. Any excuses for not now providing such 
protection to the balance of cross-border active policing data exchange will no longer 
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hold. The issue of whether this data protection should be provided at the national level, as 
is the case with the Prüm Council Decision, 225 or at the supra-national level, as with 
Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and the SIS, also needs to be resolved.  
In addition, differences in data protection and security classification regimes between the 
key institutions of Europol and Eurojust no longer appear to be justified. If both 
institutions are to operate in a high security classification regime, married to a robust data 
protection framework, and both readily exchange data between themselves, then 
differences in regimes at the two, co-located, institutions must be inexcusable. The details 
of their various provisions are to be found in classified security manuals. What appears to 
the outside observer, however, is that different regimes operate. It can only be presumed 
that differences will then arise in their two security manuals, which in due course, may well 
give rise to problems in exchanging data, the prevention and pursuit of criminals, and the 
prevention of terrorism. This cannot be allowed to happen if we are truly in the business of 
building an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Newspaper headlines have followed 
previous failures of law enforcement and intelligence communities to share intelligence 
due to underlying structural failures. In particular, in the US post-9/11 a “National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan” had to be drafted to overcome “key problems with information 
and intelligence sharing across the US”.226 Anticipated problems across the EU, as well as 
within each of our Member States, should be avoided.  
Not only is the potential for law enforcement hindered by the fractures in the EU legal 
framework analysed above, but the role of both the data security and data protection 
supervisory bodies are compromised when some parts of the data relevant to a particular 
investigation fall outside their area of supervision. In particular, the Joint Data Protection 
Secretariat set up pursuant to Decision 2000/641/JHA227, while encompassing Europol, the 
CIS and the SIS, has the glaring omission of Eurojust, the organisation which co-ordinates 
the role of investigating magistrates/senior investigating police officers. In addition, the 
EDPS has been given some role in this area, but not for all law enforcement data 
protection issues. In this writer’s view, either the EDPS should be given the entirety of the 
data protection role in law enforcement matters, assuming that he and his team have the 
necessary security clearance to deal with high-level security classified data, such as 
counter-terrorism data, or the entirety of the data protection supervision role in law 
enforcement should be given to one such person or body to deal with, separate from the 
commercially focused EDPS. In addition, organisations such as Europol cannot operate in a 
vacuum. Files need to be transferred or shared with Eurojust as investigations develop and 
the issue of cross-border prosecutions and arrests come to the fore. Equally, Frontex, 
Eurojust and Europol will also find that they have shared interests in investigating and 
prosecuting criminals involved in human trafficking and illegal immigrant smuggling into 
the EU. Their different data protection and data security regimes, as some point out, are 
going to pose a problem. 
Post-Lisbon the opportunity arises to revisit the variety of documents reviewed in this 
article, which have different histories and different authors under the auspices of the 
Council, with should benefit of the joined-up thinking which can be normally found within 
the Commission. The splitting of the old Justice and Home Affairs portfolio into two 
departments within the Commission, post-Lisbon, the Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship Directorate-General, and the new Home Affairs Directorate-General, should 
allow the latter some space to focus on these issues. They should be in a position to 
develop a more coherent and less fragmented legal framework, using the more efficient 
legal tools now available in this policy area, namely regulations and directives. While the 
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discourse in the more commercially focused debate on data protection may well be issues 
of privacy, the more fundamental issues of effective, and better targeted, law enforcement 
and the protection of individual rights in the course of law enforcement activity are key to 
the debate in this area.  
*** 
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